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RESPONDENT*S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, 
SECOND DISTRICT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An information filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court 
charges defendant John Marks with murder and with two special 
circumstances; (1) killing for financial gain and (2) killing the 
victim while lying in wait. (C.T. 2.)
At a pretrial hearing in 1981, the trial court expressly 
doubted Marks's competency to stand trial, then ordered a hearing 
to determine his competency. (C.T. 2.) When defendant next 
appeared in court, his attorney told the court that Marks's case 
was '"set for a 1368 [competency] trial, Your Honor, and I think
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all 1368 matters have been resolved.*” People v. Marks. 45 Cal. 
3d 1335, 1339 (1988) (hereinafter Marks I),
No competency hearing was held. (C.T. 2.) Defendant was 
then convicted by a jury of murder of unspecified degree.
(C.T. 10-11.) The jury found the financial gain special 
circumstance to be true. (C.T. 11.) They found the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance to be untrue, and also found 
untrue the allegation that defendant personally used a gun.
(C.T. 11.)
In Marks I. this Court reversed defendant's murder 
conviction because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing 
pursuant to Penal Code sections 1368 and 1369 after specifically 
stating a doubt as to Marks's competency to stand trial and 
ordering a hearing to determine his competency.' Id. at 1337-38. 
Upon remand, a competency hearing was held and Marks was deemed 
competent to stand trial. (C.T. 2.)
At the resumed proceedings, Marks asked the trial court to 
enter on his behalf pleas of former acquittal and once in 
jeopardy to the first degree murder charge, to the special 
circumstance charge, and to other charges. (C.T. 20-22.) Marks 
contended that, by operation of section 1157,^ he was convicted
' Unless otherwise noted all statutory references hereafter 
are to the California Penal Code.
^ "Whenever a defendant is convicted of a crime . . . which 
is distinguished into degrees, the jury . . . must find the 
degree of the crime ... of which he is guilty. Upon the 
failure of the jury . . . to so determine, the degree of the 
crime ... of which the defendant is guilty, shall be deemed to 
be of the lesser degree."
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of second degree murder because the jury at his first trial 
failed to specify the degree of the murder he committed; he 
argued that he was therefore acquitted of first degree murder. 
(C.T. 14.) The trial court agreed, stating that "by operation of 
law . . . this defendant was found guilty of . . . second degree 
murder." (C.T. 39.) The court found that jeopardy had attached 
and ruled that Harks could be tried only for second degree murder 
and for a related conspiracy. (C.T. 39.)
In February 1989, the People petitioned the Court of Appeal 
for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to strike Marks's 
pleas. (C.T. 7.) In December 1989, the writ issued directing 
the trial court to set aside its ruling, to strike Marks's pleas 
of former acquittal and once in jeopardy, and to set the matter 
for trial. People v. Superior Court (Marksl, 216 Cal. App. 3d 
679, 688 (1989) (hereinafter Marks II). The appellate court 
reasoned that the trial court's failure to hold a competency 
hearing rendered the guilty verdict void, so that defendant was 
neither placed in jeopardy nor acquitted of first degree murder. 
Id.
Marks petitioned from this judgment and this Court granted 
review on April 4, 1990. People v. Superior Court (Marks)., 268 
Cal. Rptr. 283 (1990).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the trial court's failure to hold a mental 
competency hearing pursuant to section 1368 render all final
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dispositions of the trial void, thereby allowing the People to 
validly prosecute the defendant for first degree murder?
2. May the defendant be retried for first degree murder 
after reversal of a conviction when that conviction, if let 
stand, would have been deemed one of second degree murder by 
operation of section 1157?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal will determine whether Petitioner may be 
prosecuted for a hired killing. Defendant claims to be immune 
from prosecution for first degree murder because of errors made 
at his first trial. But these errors did not harm defendant: the 
law protected him and his conviction was reversed. Defendant now 
asks this Court to wring further protection from the statutes 
when none is warranted.
In essence, defendant argues that, while his previous 
conviction was void, he was validly acquitted of first degree 
murder. His first contention rests on an incorrect and selective 
interpretation of section 1368. His second claim depends on an 
inflated and imaginary construction of section 1157.
Section 1368 voids all criminal judgments, whether they 
favor or damn the accused, by divesting the trial court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. An incompetent person cannot 
validly stand trial in California. Section 1368 expresses the 
legislature's judgment that California courts are powerless to
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adjudicate the innocence or guilt of persons who may not be 
competent.
Section 1157 imposes a lesser conviction when the jury fails 
to specify the degree of crime of which the defendant is guilty. 
Its purpose is to avoid the costs of retrial when the sole error 
in judgment lies in the form of the verdict. When the statute 
does apply, it offers a defendant no more than a conviction — it 
throws no acquittals into the bargain. When retrial is compelled 
by other error, section 1157 does not apply.
Because Petitioner's prior prosecution was void before trial 
began, he has never been placed in constitutional jeopardy. 
Because he has not been acquitted, expressly or impliedly, the 
double jeopardy prohibition is inapplicable.
The People merely seek a full and fair opportunity to test 
defendant's responsibility for first degree murder. Defendant 
has never had a fair trial. He cannot now seek to escape one.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO DETERMINE DEFENDANT'S MENTAL
COMPETENCY PURSUANT TO SECTION 1368 DIVESTED THE TRIAL COURT
OF JURISDICTION AND RENDERED ALL FINAL DISPOSITIONS VOID.
A. Section 1368 voids all final dispositions in trials
wanting of a mental competency hearing bv divesting the
trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court doubted defendant's competency to stand 
trial but failed to hold a competency hearing. Section 1368 
thereafter divested the trial court of jurisdiction over further 
criminal prosecution proceedings. This jurisdictional defect
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rendered all subsequent dispositions of the trial void. Marks I. 
45 Cal. 3d at 1337; People v. Hale. 45 Cal. 3d 531, 541 (1988). 
Once conviction of the defendant became legally impossible, he 
was outside the reach of constitutional jeopardy. Illinois v. 
Somerville. 410 U.S. 458 (1973). His liberty could not be 
impaired by a California court.
Section 1368 addresses a criminal defendant's mental 
competency to stand trial. If a trial court doubts the 
defendant's competency to stand trial, then section 1368 requires 
that court to order a hearing pursuant to section 1369 to 
determine the matter. The precepts of constitutional due process 
direct this procedure. Marks 1. 45 Cal. 3d at 1337.
The policy of prosecuting only those capable of aiding in 
their defense is strongly enforced. In fact, a court can raise 
the issue sua sponte. as this Court did in Marks I. Once the 
issue is raised, it cannot be waived or conceded by the defendant 
or by his counsel. Marks 1. 45 Cal. 3d at 1340, 1342; Hale. 44 
Cal. 3d at 541.
Finally, section 1368 divests a trial court of subject 
matter jurisdiction to proceed in the criminal prosecution of the 
defendant until his competency is determined pursuant to a 
section 1369 hearing, Marks I. 45 Cal. 3d at 1337; Hale. 44 Cal. 
3d at 541.
The divestment of jurisdiction is not derived from judicial 
decree but is statutorily mandated by section 1368 itself. 
Section 1368 declares that "all proceedings in the criminal
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prosecution shall be suspended** once a competency hearing is 
required (emphasis added). Further support that section 1368 
divests the trial court of jurisdiction is found in the statute's 
heading, which characterizes the divestment as a "stay of 
criminal proceedings." The statutory language denying 
jurisdiction cannot be stronger. In Marks I and in Hale. this 
Court recognized the statutory mandate that jurisdiction be 
divested. Marks I. 45 Cal. 3d at 1337; Hale. 44 Cal. 3d at 541. 
Failure to affirm this rule in the present case would contravene 
those precedents.
In Hale, the trial court questioned defendant's competency 
to stand trial, but did not hold a competency hearing. The 
criminal proceedings advanced and the jury convicted the 
defendant of first degree murder. This Court ruled that Hale's 
conviction was a nullity. Hale. 44 Cal. 3d at 541. Section 1368 
rendered the criminal proceedings "void because the court had 
been divested of jurisdiction to proceed pending express 
determination of the competency issue." Id. (emphasis added).
Marks I further supports the rule that failure to hold a 
required competency hearing deprives the trial court of 
jurisdiction. In Marks I. this Court sua soonte noted the 
absence of the required competency hearing from the trial court 
record. This action demonstrates that section 1368 addresses 
essential jurisdictional concerns. Errors of law generally are 
subject to remedy upon review; all, part, or none of the trial 
judgment may be affected. But when the trial court lacks
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jurisdiction, there is no valid judgment that this Court may 
review. In the former case, the trial court errs within its 
power. In the latter, the trial court has no power to err.
Defendant tortures the reasoning of Marks I and by
asking this Court to hold that his void conviction is a valid 
acquittal. Defendant's argument would require this Court to rule 
that jurisdiction exists where the California legislature has 
specifically withdrawn it — over "aH proceedings in the 
nr-iminal prosecution" awaiting a competency hearing. Cal. Penal 
Code § 1368(c) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
Defendant's argument that his section 1157 acquittal is 
valid, but that his conviction is void, relies on cases 
inapposite to the issue. He argues that there are two types of 
jurisdictional defects, those that are "fundamental" and those in 
which a court merely "exceeds" its jurisdiction. To support this 
proposition, defendant cites the dissenting opinion of yarks XI. 
Defendant argues that a "fundamental" jurisdictional defect voids 
the entire trial, but that when a court "acts in excess" of its 
jurisdiction only the excessive acts are invalid. This 
distinction is without substance.’ There is but one result of a 
jurisdictional defect: the extrajurisdictional actions of the
’ The People agree that there is a dichotomy in the types 
of jurisdictional constraints, but not the dichotomy announced by 
defendant. The correct distinction is between constitutional due 
process constraints (see, e.g., Pennover y. Neffr 95 U.S.
(1877)) and arbitrary statutory jurisdictional limits (?«q«..f 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (1989), the $50,000 amount-in-controversy required 
to trigger federal diversity jurisdiction).
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court are absolutely void. Hale. 44 Cal. 3d at 541. Defendant’s 
own cases prove this principle.
People V. Broussard. 76 Cal. App. 3d 193 (1977), involved a 
two-count criminal prosecution. One charge rested on a valid 
California statute, but no statute made criminal the conduct 
described in the second charge. The Broussard court held the 
defendant's conviction of the nonexistent crime void, reasoning 
that while the trial court had jurisdiction over the statutory 
crime, it lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant for the 
nonexistent crime. Id. at 197. Defendant argues that Broussard 
is analogous to his position because the trial court had 
jurisdiction over one criminal charge but not the other.
Defendant views this as supporting a rule of partial 
jurisdiction, valid as to acquittal but invalid as to conviction. 
Defendant fails to see that jurisdiction is absolute: it either 
exists or does not.
Proper jurisdictional analysis requires that the proceedings 
be severed into discrete jurisdictional acts. For example, the 
specific extrajurisdictional act in Broussard was the criminal 
prosecution of the nonexistent crime. Any proceedings in 
furtherance of that charge were absolutely void. See id_. 
Applying this analysis to the instant case renders the same 
result. Here, the extrajurisdictional act occurred when the 
trial court continued the criminal prosecution proceedings 
without holding a competency hearing. This act encompassed each 
criminal count charged against Marks, rendering all the
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subsequent criminal prosecution proceedings nugatory. The 
extrajurisdictional defect in Marks's case affected all charges. 
In Broussard. the jurisdictional defect was confined to the one 
nonexistent criminal charge,* As in Broussard, the discrete 
extrajurisdictional act rendered the subsequent prosecution 
absolutely void.
People V, Stankevitz. 51 Cal. 3d 72 (1990), presents a case 
where the trial court operated within its jurisdiction. In 
stankevitz. the trial court ordered a mental competency hearing 
pursuant to section 1368. Immediately following this order, the 
defendant moved to substitute counsel. The court granted the 
defendant's motion and appointed a new defense attorney. The 
substitution order occurred after the court ordered the 
competency hearing, but before it was held. Thus, the trial 
court had been statutorily divested of jurisdiction to proceed 
with the criminal prosecution by virtue of section 1368(c). This 
Court held that the substitution order was not void. Id. at 89. 
Initially, Stankevitz appears to contradict the jurisdictional 
analysis herein, but in fact it comports with it.
stankevitz did not involve an extrajurisdictional act 
because "the trial court did not reinstate 'the case against the 
defendant' in merely entertaining defendant's substitution
* Broussard did result in acquittal of the higher degree 
crime. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 198. However, that result does not 
control here. The Broussard jury impliedly acquitted Broussard 
by choosing not to convict him of the statutory crime. In this 
case we deal with a formally defective verdict. Section II of 
this Argument explores this distinction.
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motion.” Id. at 88. Consideration of the motion did not further 
the criminal prosecution. The People called no witnesses and 
proffered no incriminating evidence. Not only was the motion 
collateral to the criminal proceedings, but it was necessary to 
assure effective assistance of counsel. As a matter collateral 
to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, appointment of 
new counsel was not an extrajurisdictional act. Id. at 89. In 
contrast, the proceedings held in the instant case went to the 
heart of the criminal prosecution: the determination of those 
charges defendant was to face.
Fong Foo v. United States. 369 U.S. 141 (1962), is also 
inapplicable precedent to Marks's case. It deals with no 
jurisdictional matter. In Fona Foo. the federal trial court had 
"jurisdiction over [the defendants] and over the subject matter." 
Id. at 143. The trial court had power to acquit the defendants. 
The Fong Foo trial court merely erred on a point of procedure; 
its acquittals simply were "based on an egregiously erroneous 
foundation." Id. The Fong Foo trial court was at no time 
divested of jurisdiction. Because the judgments of acquittal 
were valid, the constitution dictated that jeopardy attach and 
that retrial be prohibited. Id. In the present case, section 
1368 divested the trial court of jurisdiction to prosecute the 
defendant. Thus Fong Foo does not control.
In summary, failure to hold a required section 1369 hearing 
divested the court of jurisdiction to continue the criminal 
prosecution. This jurisdictional deprivation renders the
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specific extra jurisdictional acts absolutely void. The void acts 
here consisted of all subsequent criminal proceedings. Thus, 
defendant has never been placed in jeopardy and therefore may be 
prosecuted on all of the original counts. Somerville. 410 U.S. 
at 460-61, 468-71.
B. Defendant's due process rights will not be violated by
retrial of first degree murder.
Defendant contends that reprosecution for first degree 
murder violates constitutional due process. He relies on the due 
process principle announced in North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 
711 (1969) . Although a state cannot penalize a criminal 
defendant for his election to exercise a right of appeal (id. 
at 726) , this rule is inapplicable here, where defendant made no 
election. The People are not retaliating; they merely seek a 
fair trial.
As discussed above, a section 1368 error affected the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. The trial 
court's lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by either party. 
Marks I. 45 Cal. 3d at 1340; Hale. 44 Cal. 3d at 541. Arguably, 
the parties have an affirmative duty to advise the court of the 
jurisdictional flaw when discovered. Thus, defendant is not 
being penalized for making an election because defendant had no 
election to make.
The procedural history proves that Marks made no election. 
This Court raised the jurisdictional issue sua sponte. Defendant
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did not elect to raise the competency issue on appeal. His due 
process rights are intact.
C. Policy compels the rule that failure to hold a recmired
competency hearing voids all criminal prosecution
proceedings regardless of outcome.
This Court can avoid recurrences of the section 1368 problem 
presented in this case. To do so, this Court must rule that all 
criminal prosecution proceedings held in violation of section 
1368 are void. A contrary rule would grant criminal defendants a 
tactic that will have a costly effect on California's scarce 
judicial resources and will subvert justice.
Future criminal defendants who wish to avail themselves of 
the rule suggested by Petitioner — that convictions entered in 
violation of section 1368 are void, but that acquittals are valid 
— need only proceed as follows. First, defendant must raise the 
question of his competency to stand trial. If the court then 
doubts defendant's competency, the proceedings are immediately 
suspended pending the competency hearing. If trial is then held 
without the required competency hearing and determination, 
defendant has nothing to lose: he is immune from conviction 
because no competency hearing was held, yet has a ghenge “to be 
acquitted. Defendant is not placed in jeopardy. The rule 
Petitioner advocates gives future criminal defendants an 
incentive to prompt a mandatory competency hearing and, at the 
same time, supplies a disincentive to demand that this required
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hearing be held. Thus, a law enacted to protect the accused 
becomes his weapon to defeat criminal responsibility.
Such a rule may lead to fraud and deceit upon trial courts. 
Our case exemplifies this logic. Here, defendant's own counsel 
informed the trial court that the section 1368 mental competency 
"matters [had] been resolved." Marks I. 45 Cal. 3d at 1339. The 
trial court, accepting the representation of defendant's own 
attorney, believed itself empowered to proceed to trial. As the 
cases establish, this error occurs frequently and should not be 
taken lightly. See, Marks I, 45 Cal. 3d at 1337-41; Hale,
44 Cal. 3d at 540-41; People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508 
(1967).
Criminal defendants should not be given the incentive to 
defraud California's overworked trial courts by building the 
foundation for inadvertent section 1368 error. More important, a 
criminal defendant should not benefit when his own counsel 
misleads the court.
The better rule avoids the carrot of the conviction-free 
trial and also eschews the stick of penalizing the criminal 
defendant. This rule merely holds that a section 1368 error 
divests a trial court of jurisdiction over all the criminal 
prosecution proceedings, rendering all final dispositions void 
regardless of their outcome. The result works no fraud and 
entails no prejudice. Rather, it leads at last to a fair trial.
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II. DEFENDANT MAY BE TRIED FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER
NOTWITHSTANDING PENAL CODE SECTION 1157,
A. There is no conviction to which section 1157 may be
applied.
Defendant questions whether he can be retried for first 
degree murder when Penal Code section 1157, had it been applied 
to his former conviction, might have converted that conviction to 
second degree murder.* This question may be answered simply: 
because of this Court's reversal of defendant's earlier 
conviction in Marks I. there is now no conviction to which 
section 1157 may be applied.^
Defendant's arguments under section 1157 cannot help him if 
the court that wrote his conviction was without power to do so. 
The People nevertheless respond to Petitioner's arguments in 
order to confine section 1157 to its language, its history, and 
its policy.
B. A conviction under Penal Code section 1157 of the
lesser degree of a crime is not an accmittal of the 
greater degree of the crime.
The language of section 1157 does not reach as far as
Petitioner would extend it. Section 1157 concerns convictions
* Section I of this Argument shows that the court that first 
tried Marks for murder was divested of jurisdiction when it 
failed to hold a competency hearing. This affliction stripped 
all subsequent proceedings in that court of If9^1 force. 
Defendant now seeks to salvage this void conviction and, as the 
discussion below shows, further seeks to transform that void 
conviction into a valid acquittal.
* There is a second easy answer: no authority supports the 
novel contention that section 1157 applies to convictions that 
are void when made.
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only? by its terms, it acquits no one. In its first sentence, 
section 1157 requires that a jury specify the degree of a 
defendant's crime when that crime is divided into degrees.^ The 
second sentence remedies a judgment that fails to so specify. 
There is no more language. The statute merely imposes a lesser 
conviction in order to remedy an unspecific finding, and 
otherwise is silent.
Nor have courts stretched section 1157 to fit defendant's 
contentions. This Court has strictly construed section 1157, 
fixing convictions at the lesser degree even when the resulting 
conviction contravenes the jury's plain intention to convict of a 
greater crime. At the same time, this Court has confined the 
provision to the boundaries of its language.
In People v- McDonald. 37 Cal. 3d 351 (1984), a jury 
convicted defendant of murder? they did not specify degree, but 
found true a robbery special circumstance.’ After the trial 
court resubmitted the degree question to the jury at the penalty 
phase, the jury found first degree murder. This Court held that
^ "Whenever a defendant is convicted of a crime . . . which 
is distinguished into degrees, the jury . . . must find the
degree of the crime of which he is guilty."
® "Upon the failure of the jury . 
degree of the crime ... of which the 
be deemed to be of the lesser degree."
. , to so determine, the 
defendant is guilty, shall
’ Oddly, the jury found McDonald not guilty of robbery. The 
people had proceeded on a theory of felony murder, 
guilty verdict precluded recharging of the robbery. Without an 
underlying felony, retrial of first degree murder was thus 
impossible. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 383 n.31.
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section 1157 nevertheless fixed defendant's conviction at the 
second degree:
the key is not whether the 'true intent* of the ju^ 
can be gleaned from circumstances outside the verdict 
form itself; instead, application of the statute turns 
only on whether the jury specified the degree in the 
verdict form.
Id. at 382. Section 1157 "'establishes a rule to which there is 
to be no exception, and the Courts have no authority to create an 
exception when the statute makes none.'" (quoting people v-
Campbell. 40 Cal. 129, 138 (1870)).
Marks's first jury convicted him of murder and found a 
special circumstance to be true. All parties understood Marks to 
be guilty of first degree murder — indeed, the record does not 
show that defendant objected to suffering a penalty phase, 
although he might have avoided that procedure by invoking section 
1157, If Marks's conviction had not been struck in Mar)£s_I, 
section 1157 and McDonald would likely command that he be 
convicted of second degree murder. But they would require no 
more.
Courts have long recognized that section 1157 often works 
considerable inequity by awarding a defendant a less onerous 
conviction for his more egregious crime. They have long 
hesitated to apply section 1157 where to do so relieves a 
defendant of responsibility for his crimes. For example, in 
People V. Lamb. 176 Cal. App. 3d 932 (1986), the Court of Appeal
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refused to apply section 1192,'° despite the trial court's
failure to determine the degree of burglary, because defendant
had expressly pleaded guilty to burglary in the first degree.
The Lamb court complained that sections 1157 and 1192
have been strictly and literally applied in favor 
of defendants to occasionally reach results which have 
been described as a triumph of form over substance.
The frustration with form arises because the appellate 
court may not imply the degree of the crime from some 
other factual findings even though the logical 
reasoning process would leave no room for doubt on the 
degree of crime to which the defendant was found to be 
guilty ....
Id. at 934 (citations omitted). Similar frustration was 
expressed by this Court 120 years ago. Campbell, 40 Cal. at
139-40.
This criticism persists. Last year, in People v. Bonillas. 
48 Cal. 3d 757 (1989), this Court again reviewed section 1157.
In Bonillas, the jury returned a verdict of "guilty of murder as 
charged in the information." Id. at 768. Four days later, the 
trial court denied defendant's motion to fix the conviction at 
second degree; it then ordered the jury to consider the degree 
question. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first 
degree. This Court refused to apply section 1157, stating that 
because "the jury here [had] remained in the court's 
control . . . the court was authorized to reconvene the jury to 
complete its verdict." Id. at 773.
Section 1192 mirrors section 1157 but applies to guilty 
pleas and bench trials.
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Justice Arguelles concurred, disparaging otherwise "rigid
application of section 1157":
From virtually the outset of the provision's enactment, 
many cases have construed section 1157 as pres^ibing 
an inflexible rule, which often requires a court to 
reduce the degree of a crime in the face of clear and 
reliable evidence that the jury must have actually 
found the defendant guilty of the higher degree
offense.
Id. at 802-03.
Bnnnias avoided application of section 1157 by upholding 
the express degree finding of a reconvened jury. Lajnb held that 
section 1192 did not apply despite the unspecific finding of the 
trial court, where defendant's own plea specified the degree of 
the offense. In People v. Johns. 145 Cal. App. 3d 281 (1983), 
section 1157 could not be avoided, but the appellate court 
nevertheless lamented, "[u]nfortunately, on this point, form 
triumphs over substance, and the law is traduced." at 295.
in p.nme V. Dixon. 24 Cal. 3d 43 (1979), defendant sought 
to apply section 1157 where the record suggested that the jury 
had been deadloc)ced on the question of degree. When the judge 
instructed them to further deliberate, they returned a verdict of 
first degree murder. This Court refused to extend section 1157 
beyond its explicit language, holding it inapplicable where the
jury is unable to specify degree. Idj. at 52.
In the instant case, Petitioner asks for much more. Having 
secured one reversal, Marks first invokes section 1157 where it 
does not apply. He then extends it beyond its plain language by 
asking this Court to deem him acquitted of the charge for which
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the jury thought him responsible. It is true that Marks night 
have been deemed guilty of second degree murder had a proper 
competency hearing been held. But nothing in the language of 
section 1157 suggests that he be deemed acquitted of murder in 
the first degree. The message of McDonald. Cairtpt>?llf and
Bonillas is to the contrary: section 1157 is to be enforced where 
it applies, when it applies. Nothing in California law compels 
the expansion that defendant seeks.
Dictum may be found to say that, where defendant is 
convicted of second degree murder under section 1157, "by that 
verdict he had been acquitted of first degree murder." people v, 
Hughes. 171 Cal. App. 2d 362, 370 (1959). Hvqllgg posed no 
question of acquittal and no question of retrial. It neither 
raised nor answered a former jeopardy question. Hughes simply 
rejected the trial court's resubmission to the jury of a degree 
question after the penalty phase had begun.
Defendant's arguments conflict not only with the plain 
language of section 1157 and with the confines of its subsequent 
judicial construction, but with the statute's underlying policy. 
The rationale that supports section 1157 is not implicated where
retrial is compelled by other error.
Until 1949, section 1157 provided no remedy for the jury's 
failure to specify degree. The court-crafted remedy was to set 
aside the verdict and order a new trial. People v.—l^e Yune
" This Court has found other error in the Hughes decision. 
See Bonillas, 48 Cal. 3d at 774.
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Chong. 94 Cal. 379, 386 (1892). The legislature overruled this 
practice in 1949 by amending both sections 1157 and 1192. Sfig In 
Harris. 67 Cal. 2d 876 (1967).
This Court has recognized that the legislature's purpose in 
enacting the 1949 amendments was not to reward defendants for 
errors of court and jury, but to avoid the onus of duplicate 
trials when that burden is founded on a mere formal defect in the 
verdict. Id. at 881. "By amending section 1192 the legislature 
. . . determined that the state's interest in securing a 
conviction of a higher degree is outweighed by the administrative 
convenience of terminating litigation by imposing a lesser 
sentence when the trial court fails to determine the 
degree." Id.
Retrial doubles the cost of prosecution and taxes state 
coffers. In enacting sections 1157 and 1192, the legislature 
sacrificed the state's right to retry an accused for the sole 
purpose of administrative convenience. The legislature 
recognized that a mere defect in verdict form did not justify the 
costs of a new trial. These enactments are a simple gujd pro 
quo: in exchange for a valid conviction, the state forfeits its 
right to retry the defendant.’^ The state's sole incentive lies 
in the administrative savings.
Clearly, if the legislature wished to reward defendants 
with acquittals, they could have expressly done so either when 
they amended sections 1157 and 1192 in 1949, or in any of the 41 
years that have followed.
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Where retrial is compelled by other error, there is no 
convenience and no incentive. The state saves nothing. Because 
of the disposition of Marks's automatic appeal, the state's 
choice is either to retry him or to drop all charges. But the 
legislature struck its bargain under section 1157 with only those 
defendants who do not face retrial whose convictions are 
afflicted only by unspecific degree findings. It did not and 
would not choose to forfeit its right to retry a defendant whose 
conviction is reversed on grounds other than those covered by 
sections 1157 and 1192.
This mi id pro quo is a narrow bargain: in exchange for the 
state's sacrifice, defendant receives a lesser conviction. But 
Marks asks for much more. First, he asks that the lesser 
conviction he might have received be deemed an acquittal of the 
greater crime with which he was charged. Then he asks that this 
possible lesser conviction be deemed jeopardy, barring retrial of 
the greater offense. Petitioner neglects to see that in enacting 
sections 1157 and 1192, the legislature's purpose was to obtain 
convictions, not to avoid them.
C. Defendant has not been placed jn constitutional 
-ieopardv.
Section 1023 codifies the double jeopardy provision of 
article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution by barring a 
second prosecution whenever defendant "is convicted or acquitted 
or has been once placed in jeopardy . . . ." A defendant may 
nevertheless be tried twice when his prior conviction has been
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set aside on appeal. Green v. United States. 355 U.S. 184, 189 
(1957) .
Over 100 years ago, this Court rejected the argument that 
double jeopardy bars retrial of an offense when an earlier 
verdict is faulty because of an unspecific degree finding.
People V. Travers. 75 Cal. 580, 582-83 (1887). Marks argues that 
his case falls within the doctrine of implied acquittal 
subsequently announced by the United States Supreme Court in 
Green and adopted by this Court in Gomez v,_ Superior Court, 50 
Cal. 2d 640 (1958).
Defendant's case does not fall within the doctrine of 
implied acquittal. In Gomez, this Court held that a defendant's 
prior conviction of petty theft impliedly acquitted him of grand 
theft and thus precluded the People from retrying defendant for 
the greater offense. Gomez is fundamentally different from 
Marks's case: Gomez's jury chose to convict him of the lesser 
crime, thus implying that he was not proved guilty of the greater 
offense. Gomez did not arise under and does not implicate 
section 1157. Gomez has been applied only where the jury tests 
the facts against the evidence and makes an explicit finding that 
only the lesser crime has been proved. A section 1157 
conviction, on the other hand, is imposed regardless of the 
evidence and without consideration of the facts, for the sole 
purpose to avoid costly retrial.
Here, the record shows that Marks's prior jury wished to 
convict him of the greater offense but were not properly
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instructed to find degree. Gomez, where the jury was instructed 
about two offenses but found only one to be true, thus implicated 
the established rule that, once acquitted, a defendant cannot be
retried for the same offense. See United States v,_163
U.S. 662, 671 (1896). Marks stands in different shoes: he was 
not expressly convicted of a lesser crime but was rather 
convicted of "murder" generally. And the record is clear that 
his prior jury, who later fixed his penalty at death, wished to 
convict him of murder in the first degree.'^ Marks was impliedly 
acquitted of nothing.
Gomez was jeopardized by his trial, but Petitioner was not. 
Marks*s first jury was powerless to acquit or convict him. As 
Section I of this Argument shows, the trial court lost 
jurisdiction upon its failure to hold a competency hearing. 
Although this defect was unrecognized at the time, the 
proceedings that followed nonetheless lacked a breath of legal 
force. Power had been stripped from the court, which was 
thereafter unable lawfully to empanel a jury. The jury was 
therefore powerless under the law to determine Marks's innocence 
or guilt. Because no competency hearing was held, the subseqi^ent 
prosecution was void. It was void then and it is void now.
Under McDonald, this circumstance could not defeat 
section 1157, if it applied to Petitioner's case. Mcponald turns 
a blind eye to the intention of the jury. But under gomez, the 
intention of the jury determines whether a defendant has been 
impliedly acquitted for former jeopardy purposes. Thus, only a 
sighted eye can determine whether Marks was impliedly acquitted 
of first degree murder when his prior jury (a) convicted him of 
murder, (b) found the special circumstance true, and <c) set the 
penalty at death.
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Marks's suggestion that he was jeapordized by these null 
pjfoceedings is nonsensical.
Further, Gomez applies only where acquittal may be implied 
from the jury's choice of a lesser conviction. No acquittal is 
implied by a conviction under section 1157, which concerns 
convictions only, and which exists solely for the purpose of 
administrative convenience. "[Slection 1157's mandate ... is 
not based on constitutional principles of double jeopardy but is 
based on a pure legislative enactment which inures to the benefit 
of the defendant." People v. Saille. 221 Cal. App. 3d 307, 328 
(1990). In Gomez, defendant's conviction was fixed by a jury who 
had tested the evidence against the facts. In contrast, a 
conviction under section 1157 is made by fiat. It is a judgment 
read from a statute book, imposed regardless of actual guilt.
"The determination of degree pursuant to section 1157 is not a 
factual acquittal by the jury; it is not based on a lack of 
substantial evidence; and it does not involve precepts of double 
jeopardy.” Sallle. 221 Cal. App. 3d at 329.
D, The state has had no full and fair opportunity ^o try
the defendant.
The double jeopardy prohibition serves several purposes, 
none of which are implicated in Petitioner's case. The rule 
prevents the state from repeatedly attempting to convict a 
defendant for the same offense, subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense, ordeal, and harassment, gpggn, 355 U.S. at 187-88. It 
also '"forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the
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prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it 
failed to muster in the first proceeding.*** People v. 
pr.r;Versmith. 217 Cal. App. 3d 968, 972 (1990). The state is 
nevertheless entitled to a full and fair opportunity to convict 
the defendant. Richardson v. United States. 468 U.S. 317, 326 
(1984).
In the instant case, the state has had no full and fair 
opportunity to try Petitioner. The People played no role in the 
error that led to reversal of defendant*s conviction.
Defendant*s counsel informed the trial court that the 
section 1368 question had been resolved and that he and two 
psychiatrists believed that Marks was competent to stand trial. 
The People lacked the knowledge and the need to contest this 
representation. This Court nevertheless reversed the conviction 
that followed because the trial court did not hold a competency 
hearing. Not only was defendant*s conviction void, but the 
foundation of that voidness was laid by his own counsel.
Nor does the record show that the People prevented a second 
degree murder instruction from being read at trial: **the trial 
court inexplicably denied defendant's requested instruction . . . 
that the jury specify the degree of murder." Marks I, 45 Cal. 3d 
at 1344.
Nor can the state be said to be repeatedly trying to convict 
defendant of the same offense. In truth, the state has once 
convicted him of first degree murder. The record shows it: a 
conviction of murder with a special circumstance finding and a
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sentence of death. Marks does not allege that the People seek 
retrial to harass or embarass him or to muster new evidence. 
Indeed, the People seek only to fairly try defendant's 
responsibility for murder. The state has not tried once and 
failed to make this proof: it has tried and succeeded.
When a defendant has been erroneously convicted, as Marks 
has been, double jeopardy does not bar a second trial of the 
offense. United States v, Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964).
CONCLUSION
The appellate court correctly ruled that Penal Code section 
1368 strips a trial court of jurisdiction to convict or to 
exonerate an accused when competency is doubted but is not 
properly determined. This ruling should be affirmed.
Penal Code section 1157 should not be extended to award 
acquittals, whether actual or implied. It must be limited to its 
language and its policy.
Finally, the implied acquittal principle of green and Gojtiez 
should not be extended to this case, where the prior jury 
explicitly believed defendant to be guilty of first degree murder 
and impliedly acquitted him of nothing. Petitioner was not 
jeopardized by these proceedings, which were void when begun.
For the above reasons, defendant may be tried again for 
first degree murder.
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Dated 23 October 1990
